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Abstract: IEEE 802.11 Wireless Mesh Network (WMN) is an 
emerging low cost, decentralized community-based broadband 
technology, which is based on self-healing and multi-hop 
deployment of Access Points (APs), so that to increase the coverage 
area with maximum freedom to end-users to join or leave the 
network from anywhere anytime having low deployment and 
maintenance cost. Such kind of decentralized structure and multi-
hop architecture increases its security vulnerabilities especially 
against the APs. One of such possible security attack is the 
placement of cloned AP to create serious performance degradation 
in IEEE 802.11 WMN. In this paper, we discuss the different 
security vulnerabilities of AP in IEEE 802.11 WMN along with 
possible research directions. We also propose a mutual cooperation 
mechanism between the multi-hop APs and serving gateway so that 
to detect and prevent the possibility of cloned AP. In this way the 
large scale exploitation of IEEE 802.11 WMN can be eliminated.  
.  
Keywords: Wireless Mesh Network, Denial of Service (DoS), 
Security, Multi-hop, Cloned Access Point 
 
1. Introduction 
Wireless broadband networks are the hot topic. The 
industries and the researchers are trying for such a broadband 
technology which ensures high bandwidth internet provision 
to a large geographical area with minimum deployment and 
maintenance cost having maximum flexibility for end users to 
connect from anywhere anytime. The broadband wireless 
technologies like IEEE 802.11 WLAN and IEEE 802.16 
WMAN are making progress rapidly.  
Now, the emerging 4th generation broadband technology of 
WMN, which is decentralized, self-healing, self-configuring 
and facilitates the integration of other wireline and wireless 
networks such as WLAN, WMAN, Cellular, Sensor and 
LANs. Both IEEE 802.11 WLAN and WMN use APs as 
backbone devices. Being single-hop in nature, WLAN’s AP 
directly connects each node with the internet. In IEEE 802.11 
WMN, the APs serve in multi-hop manners, and the end-user 
nodes may be one-hop, two-hop, three-hop and so on away 
depending on the distance between the client nodes and 
gateway. Normally, there is one gateway, and all the APs in 
WMN are directly or indirectly (forming hops) connected 
with the gateway for broadband access.  
Furthermore, IEEE WMN is self-healing and self-
configuring in nature. Unlike, WLAN, WMN conducts three 
levels of operations. At the lower level, the mesh nodes 
operate which are either static or mobile. APs or mesh 
routers form the multi-hop structure at middle level by 
connecting the mesh nodes directly with gateway or 
indirectly (through another AP). At top level, mesh gateways 
are in operations, which are connected with the Internet. The 
traffic flow in WMN is between the mesh nodes and the 
gateways through the multi-hop backbone of APs. The multi-
hop architecture and self-healing nature of WMN greatly 
reduce the maintenance and deployment cost as compared to 
WLAN, however increases security vulnerabilities to many 
potential attacks against network devices like APs.  
 
Being a key component of WMN, APs may be the key 
targets of the attackers. In the current setup of WMN, APs 
are not fully secured, and the attackers not only conduct 
physical damage but also can easily compromised it by 
launching passive, active and Denial of Service (DoS) 
attacks. In passive attack, the attackers only analyze the 
network traffic passing through the APs to get valuable 
information without harming the traffic or APs. In active 
attack, the attackers may create serious routing disruptions by 
altering or dropping the packets or selectively forward the 
packets toward the destination. In DoS attack [5], the attacker 
makes the services of AP unavailable to the legitimate users 
by flooding to overflow the AP’s resources such as memory, 
computational or bandwidth. One of such attack in the multi-
hop architecture and self-healing nature of WMN is the 
placement of cloned AP at the desired location.  
Cloned AP can be used for passive traffic analysis as well 
as active packets dropping or selective forwarding. However, 
the severe type of attack using cloned AP would be DoS 
attack, in which the cloned AP may be used to isolate the 
particular location from the rest of the network, and hence 
the legitimate users will not be able to access the broadband 
services. Keeping in view the importance of IEEE 802.11 
WMN and the severity of cloned AP attack, we proposed a 
mechanism which is based on the mutual cooperation 
amongst the backbone APs and the serving gateway so that to 
detect and prevent such kind of attack, which may result in a 
large scale exploitation of the broadband services.  
This paper presents two principal findings. First, all 
possible security vulnerabilities of AP in IEEE 802.11 WMN 
are described with possible research directions. Second, we 
elaborate the possibility and severity of cloned AP attack in 
the multi-hop architecture and self-healing nature of IEEE 
802.11 WMN, and propose a mutual cooperation mechanism 
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between the multi-hop backbone APs and serving gateway to 
eliminate the possibility of cloned AP attack. The remaining 
of the paper continues by giving an overview of the AP 
mechanism in IEEE 802.11 WMN along with features, 
specifications and encryption weaknesses. Then the possible 
vulnerabilities of APs in IEEE 802.11 WMN and some future 
research and mitigation techniques are discussed. Next, the 
cloned AP attack and its consequences in IEEE 802.11 
WMN are described. Finally a mutual cooperation 
mechanism is proposed between backbone APs and the 
serving gateway so that to avoid the possible large scale 
exploitation due to the cloned AP attack.  
2. AP Mechanism in WMN 
In IEEE 802.11 WMN, the APs are the backbone devices 
that operate in many modes such as single-radio wireless 
mesh, dual-radio wireless mesh and multi-radio wireless 
mesh at physical layer [10].  In single-radio mesh also known 
as first generation mesh, each node acts as an AP, and relay 
traffic for other nodes. The same radio is used for nodes as 
well as backhaul access, which is the inexpensive form of 
wireless mesh network, but may result in traffic congestion 
due to the heavy load, and will not deliver efficient 
broadband services to large coverage area.  
The scalability of WMN can be improved by using dual-
radio mesh which is also called second generation of mesh, in 
which the APs having two separate radios for client access 
and the backhaul connectivity, and this technology separated 
the user traffic form backhaul traffic. This offers significant 
performance improvement, However, in dual-radio; the 
backhaul shared medium contention may decrease the 
capacity and increase the latency.  
To overcome the problems of dual-radio architecture, third 
generation multi-radio solution was proposed, which uses 
separate radio for client access and multiple radios for 
backhaul so that to improve the capacity and to decrease the 
latency, as in multi-radio scheme, multiple radios are 
dedicated to backhaul. Regardless of the radios scheme used 
in WMN, APs form the backbone multi-hop architecture to 
reduce the cost and to increase the coverage area. These are 
used to connect the mesh nodes with the gateways to access 
the broadband services. In Fig. 1, it is shown that node C is 
two-hop away from the internet, while node D is three-hop 
away. Nodes I and H are four-hop away. It should be noted 
that in IEEE 802.11, the clients can also relay traffic for each 
other, as node D is relaying traffic for nodes H and I, where 
both these nodes are not in the direct communication range of 
any AP or mesh router. There may be some confusion over 
the Wireless Mesh Router (WMR) and AP. The main 
difference is that, an AP allows a client to access a single 
network, while the WMR allows a client to access multiple 
networks. One AP can communicate with 30 nodes located 
within the transmission range of 100 meters. However, 
factors such as placement, height, obstacles, weather, 
operating radio frequency and the power output can 
significantly decrease the actual communication range. 
 
Fig. 1. WMN Architecture 
The current standards of IEEE has made significant 
progress as 
• IEEE 802.11b standard provides 11 Mbps bandwidth 
• IEEE 802.11a and IEEE 802.11g provide 54 Mbps 
bandwidth 
• IEEE 802.11n ensures 540 Mbps bandwidth 
However, if all the overheads are considered such as 
interference, MAC contention, 802.11 headers, ACK and 
packet errors, the actual goodput available is almost half [5]. 
In IEEE 802.11 WLANs and WMN, Probe request frames 
are used by client nodes to discover and scan the AP of a 
wireless network. If a wireless network exists then the client 
node gets Probe response frame from all the available APs. 
The information about the AP is stored in the Information 
Base (IB) of the client’s wireless adaptor. Now the client 
sends an association request to the AP on the basis of the 
strongest signal.  
The important specifications of an AP are given in the 
Table 1. WMN and WLAN use Wired Equivalent Privacy 
(WEP), WEP1, Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA1) and WPA2 
for authentication and encryption between the AP and the 
client nodes [8]. The WEP and WEP1 mechanisms have 
some built-in limitations which can easily be compromised 
by the adversary to gain access to the AP. The shared secret 
keys of WEP are almost static and remain the same for long 
period. This provides enough time to hackers to analyze and 
hack into WEP enabled wireless networks using passive 
eavesdropping attack, in which the attacker can analyze the 
communication between a legitimate node and AP. 
Furthermore WAP uses a 64-bit encryption (40-bit 
encryption key and 24-bit initialization vector (IV)) for both 
client and AP [3] which can easily be compromised by the 
adversary by mean of Brute Force attack [4]. The WEP 
protocol uses RC4 cipher symmetrical cryptographic 
algorithm with either 40-bit or 128-bit key. In this symmetric 
key cryptographic algorithm, the secret key always remains 
the same, and the change in the key sequence is due to the 
change in IV every time. Since the length of IV in WEP is 
24-bit, and can only produce maximum of 224 possible 
combinations [9], which are not sufficient, and can be 
compromised for the key-reuse attack.  
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Table 1. Specification of an AP 
Features Specification 
Standards IEEE 802.11b, IEEE 802.11g, IEEE 
802.11a, IEEE 802.11n 
Operating 
modes 
AP mode, Repeater mode, Bridge mode, 
Client mode 
Data rates Normally, 11 Mbps and 54 Mbps 
MAC Carrier Sense Multiple Access with 
Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA)  
Power supply DC 5V-9V, 700mA-2A, 10W 





Security WEP, WPA 
WPA is much better mechanism which provides 
encryption via the Temporary Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) 
and addresses the weaknesses of WEP by providing some 
enhancements. However, it is needs firmware upgrade of the 
existing hardware or it is enabled in new hardware. WPA2 
uses more powerful method of encryption known as 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). AES supports key 
sizes of 128 bits, 192 bits, and 256 bits. It is backward 
compatible with WPA and uses a fresh set of keys for every 
session; hence every packet that sent over the wireless 
medium is encrypted with a unique key. As WPA needs 
firmware upgrade, otherwise cannot be enabled in the 
existing hardware, that is why, still WAP is widely used. 
These weaknesses in encryption mechanisms increase the AP 
vulnerabilities to many active, passive and DoS security 
attacks.  
 
3. Possible attacks against AP in WMN    
 
As early discussed, In IEEE 802.11 WMNs, the large scale 
dense and multi-hop deployment of APs having the 
capabilities of self-healing and self-configuring are such 
characteristics which not only facilitate the end-users but also 
open many doors for the attackers to execute large scale 
exploitation. Some of the possible security attacks against 
APs in IEEE 802.11 WMN are given below and are 
summarized in Table 2.  
• Jamming attack 
• Fairness attack 
• Flooding attack 
• De-authentication attack 
• Flash crowd  
• Cloned AP attack 
Jamming [1] the broadband services is an easy way to 
zero-services, where zero-service is a situation where a 
network is down for legitimate users after a severe attack.  In 
WLAN, the attacker needs to be near the premises of target 
organization to launch jamming attack against the APs. On 
the other hand, WMN is a large scale broadband network in 
which the APs are deployed city-wide for community-based 
broadband services, which facilitates the attacker to conduct 
jamming from anywhere anytime. The communication 
between AP and the nodes in the range can easily be jammed 
by introducing a source of strong noise so that to interfere the 
physical channel. Jamming a single AP would make the 
services unavailable to the nodes in direct communication 
range of that AP. The more severe form of this attack is the 
distributed jamming, in which many attackers at the same 
time target many APs in WMN, and makes the zero-service 
for a large coverage area. However, jamming attack on the 
gateways would even result in the total failure of the WMN, 
as all the APs are connected with the gateway in WMN. 
There is a need to consider the implementation of spread 
spectrum techniques or cognitive radio mechanism [2] at 
Physical layer so that to reduce the signal interference and to 
improve the goodput at user end. 
In WMN, the bandwidth share decreases as the number of 
hops increases from the gateway i.e. an AP which is one hop 
away from the gateway will get more share of bandwidth as 
compared to an AP which is two hops away. The attackers 
can exploit this feature of WMN for bandwidth fairness 
attack. The attackers who manage to increase the number of 
hops between gateway and APs by exploiting the network 
protocols would cause the bandwidth of the users connected 
to the APs to reduce in great extent. The purpose behind this 
attack is, the attacker has the desire to increase its own share 
of bandwidth and QoS at the cost of other nodes. In [7], it is 
described that a DoS attack on gateway by a nearby mesh 
client is a serious threat to a longer hop communications 
which already receive low bandwidth due to the poor 
performance of multi-hop network. One of the experiment in 
[13], shown that if the number of hops are more than four, 
then it is not feasible for any multi-media application. A user 
who is more than four hops away from the gateway will not 
be able to smoothly access the bandwidth hungry 
applications such as IP-TV, Video on Demand (VoD), video 
conferencing etc. There is a need for such scheduling and 
bandwidth allocation mechanisms which ensure relatively 
smooth distribution of bandwidth to all the APs. Packet 
priority mechanisms can also be investigated so that to assign 
higher priority to a multi-media packet over the WMN. 
In single node flooding, an attacker transmits a flood of 
packets toward a target node to consume its resources or 
congest the network and degrade its performance. Such type 
of flooding can be conducted by smurf attack in which a 
target node is flooded via spoofed broadcast ping messages. 
In Smurf attack, ICMP echo is used for flooding, while 
Fraggle flooding, an UDP echo is used to overload the 
network as well as the target node. An active cache based 
defence against the flooding style of DoS attacks is proposed 
for WMN in [7]; however this mechanism may not be able to 
handle Distributed DoS (DDoS) attack.  
DoS is mostly launched by a single person or single host, 
however in DDoS attacks, multiple infected system flood to 
break or completely block the services of any of the three 
important elements of wireless networks [12], such as 
• Bandwidth 
• Access Points (APs), gateways or any server 
• Target user’s system 
The attackers usually try to overflow the resources of these 
three elements to bring serious performance degradation in 
the wireless network to reduce the bandwidth, prevent access 
to the services or particular service, or to stop the services to 
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a specific system. Such security mechanisms need to be 
investigated at these backbone devices which can distinguish 
the normal flow and flooding from malicious node as well as 
distributive flooding from many zombies, and has the ability 
to block or isolate the malicious node or zombies from the 
network by sending block signal, also the security mechanism 
keep the record of MAC addresses of all the malicious nodes 
so that not to allow them to take part in network operations. 
Another flooding type attack is Probe request frames 
flooding, which are used by client nodes to discover a 
wireless network. If a wireless network exist then the AP or 
WMR respond with Probe response frame. The attacker can 
send a flood of probe request frames using MAC spoofing to 
represent large number of wireless nodes scanning for the 
wireless network heavily overloading and consuming the 
computation power, memory resources and bandwidth 
resources of the AP [12]. The more harsh form of probe-
request flooding would be distributed probe-request flooding, 
in which large number of nodes with the ability of MAC 
spoofing may overflow the AP memory or computational 
resources, and hence zero-service situation.  
Another problem in the AP which may result in the DoS 
attack is the deauthentication attack. The 802.11 client first 
authenticate with the AP before the start of communications. 
When the client finishes its communication and wants to 
leave the network, then it needs to send deauthentication 
message to the AP to stop the communication. This 
deauthentication message is itself not authenticated. The 
attacker may spoof this message on behalf of the target node, 
and the AP will stop its communication with the target node 
until the authentication is re-established [11]. As the 
attackers use spoofing mechanism to conduct de-
authentication and probe-request flooding sort of attacks. A 
location-based detection mechanism can be investigated for 
preventing these attacks, in which the AP has the capability 
to locate the exact location of the node. Once, the location is 
accurately determined, then the AP can detect the malicious 
node even if it is spoofing, as the location will be the same. 
Furthermore, the de-authentication attack can be mitigated by 
improving the encryption and authentication mechanisms in 
IEEE 802.11 WMN.  
The operations of WMN need dense multi-hop APs for 
broadband coverage and some may overlap to provide better 
bandwidth in heavily loaded geographic area. The WMN 
support roaming feature, as each node is equipped with a 
wireless card that implements the roaming algorithm. 
Generally up to 30 legitimate users with normal traffic flow 
can access the AP on the basis of the strongest signal 
received. When the number of users exceed the certain limit 
may result in bandwidth as well as throughput reduction. In 
flash crowd also termed as innocent DoS attack, no attacker 
is involved, instead when legitimate users requests exceed the 
certain threshold may overflow the memory, computation and 
bandwidth resources of the AP, which may bring down the 
network services. Currently, the nodes access the AP on the 
basis of the strongest signals. An area having more 
broadband users may overload the AP resources, and can 
result in Innocent DoS attack. Here, there is a need to 
investigate the possibility of load balancing amongst the APs.  
 
Table 2. Possible attacks and defences against APs in WMN 
Attack Purpose Possible Research 
directions 























resources of AP 
Location based 
detection mechanism 










4. Cloned Access Point 
 
As early discussed, WMN is a large scale city-wide, 
community-based broadband network; it needs a lot of APs 
to be deployed for the broadband services. In cloned AP 
attack, first, an attacker gains illegal access to the internal 
configuration of an AP either with the help of brute-force 
mechanism by testing all the possible passwords periodically 
or using sniffer, which are applications used to capture and 
read the ongoing packets. Once, the attacker gains an access 
to the internal configuration of the AP, and then a duplicate 
copy of that compromised AP is created and places it at some 
important strategic location to offer connectivity to legitimate 
nodes. The purpose of duplicate AP attack is to  
• Capture and analyse all the packets passing through it 
• Bring routing disruption by misdirecting the packets  
• Offer only connectivity to legitimate users without 
offering any broadband services (zero-service 
situation).  
• Isolate a particular location from the rest of the 
network.  
One solution to this kind of attack is the periodic erasure and 
reprogramming of the access point [6]. However this is not 
the perfect solution as during the reprogramming and erasure 
process, the end-users will not be able to access the network.  
 
4.1 Mutual Cooperation Mechanism  
 
The utmost priority for the research community is to 
protect this multi-hop broadband wireless network from 
security attacks, in particularly DoS attacks against the APs, 
because they are operating in the middle level. If the APs are 
protected, it means there are less chances of severe attacks 
and exploitations at the top gateway level. As gateways are 
serving many APs and are directly connected with the wired 
internet infrastructure, if the attacker successfully target the 
gateways, its consequences will be more severe and may 
even result in the Zero-Service of the broadband network. 
Thus to keep the WMN broadband services functional 
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without any disruption, and to avoid the zero-service 
situation, there is indeed necessary to protect the AP from 
security attacks especially DoS. 
The cloned AP attack can be easily launched due to the self-
healing and self-configuring nature of IEEE 802.11 WMN. 
The proposed solution to overcome the cloned AP attack is 
based on the mutual cooperation between the multi-hop APs 
and the serving gateway in WMN. The proposed mechanism 
is given in Fig. 2.  
 
Fig. 2. Mutual Cooperation Mechanism 
When a new AP will join the IEEE 802.11 WMN, it will 
send a friendly packet to all those neighbours which are in its 
direct communication range. When the existing APs receive 
the friendly packet, the AP performs two steps. 
• The new AP information is stored in the neighbour 
database. The information contains the Service Set 
Identifier (SSID), IP and MAC address. 
• A report is send to the gateway, that a new AP has 
been added to the network. The report contains the 
SSID, MAC and IP address of the newly joined AP. 
The SSID is a unique identifier that client devices use to 
associate with an AP. It is case-sensitive, and the normal 
length is 2-32 characters.  
Once, the gateway receives the information about a new AP, 
the information is analysed with the help of APs database 
which contains the information such as SSIDs, IP addresses, 
MAC addresses and the neighbours of that AP. If an AP 
already exist having the same information, then the new AP 
is treated as cloned AP, otherwise normal. Once the gateway 
makes the decision that the new AP is normal, an 
acknowledgement message is send to all its neighbours that 
they can route the traffic, if the newly added AP is cloned, 
then the gateway informs all its neighbours not to route the 
traffic through it. The algorithm of the proposed mechanism 
is given in flow chat in Fig. 3.  
 
Fig. 3. Complete operation of the proposed algorithm 
For instance, an IEEE 802.11 WMN consists of six APs 
which are providing broadband services to the clients. In first 
case, a normal AP is added in WMN as shown in Fig. 4 (a), 
while in second case, a cloned AP is added as shown in Fig. 
4 (b). When a normal AP is added in the IEEE 802.11 
WMN, the neighbours AP2 and AP3 send a report to the 
gateway. The gateway analyzer analyses, and store the 





Table 3. Information of AP 7 in APs database of gateway. 
SSID IP MAC  Neighbours 
AP7 192.168.0.124 00-1E-4C-
A7-FF-32 
AP2 + AP3 (IPs 
+ MACs) 
As this information does not already exist in the gateway 
APs database, so the AP7 is treated as a normal AP.  
In Fig. 4 (b), the attacker gets access to the internal 
configuration of AP1, and a cloned AP7 is placed at a 
desired location to degrade the normal network operation. 
The information of AP1 already exists in the APs table of 
gateway as shown in Table 4.  
Table 4. Information of AP 1 in APs database of gateway. 
SSID IP MAC  Neighbours 
AP1 192.168.0.154 00-1E-4E-
A9-FF-82 
AP2 + AP4 + AP5 
(IPs + MACs) 
As soon as the cloned AP7 is placed, the neighbours AP5 
and AP6 send a report to the gateway. The information are 
analyzed and compared with the APs database. The gateway 
detects that such an entry already exist in the APs database, 
Fig. 4 (a) Normal AP is 
added 
 
Fig. 4 (b) Cloned AP is 
added 
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and hence the newly added AP is treated as cloned. The 
gateway sends a message to all the neighbours of the cloned 
AP not to route traffic through it. Hence the cloned AP is 




The multi-hop architecture and self-healing nature of 
WMN not only  increase the freedom to join and leave the 
network from anywhere anytime, but also decrease the 
deployment and maintenance cost. Both these factors depend 
on the dense deployment of APs. The APs are vulnerable to 
many DoS attacks such as jamming, fairness, distributed 
flooding, de-authentication, flash crowd, probe-request 
flooding and cloned AP. Cloned AP is a severe attack against 
the IEEE 802.11 WMN, which can result in passive traffic 
analysis, misdirecting network packets, and even can isolate a 
portion of network which may result in zero-services to the 
legitimate end-users. The proposed mechanism is based on 
the mutual cooperation between the backbone APs and the 
serving gateway to detect and prevent the possibility of 
placing cloned AP anywhere in IEEE 802.11 WMN. When a 
new AP is added to the network, the neighbours APs 
immediately send a report to the serving gateway. The 
gateway analyzes and decides on the basis of the received 
information, that whether the newly added AP is normal or 
cloned, and acknowledge accordingly. The security of such a 
city-wide community-based wireless network is highly 
important, as only secure IEEE 802.11 WMN is necessary 
for world-wide acceptance and commercial deployment.  
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